Banks, credit reallocation, and creative destruction (with C. Keuschnigg and M. Kogler)
CEPR Discussion Paper No.17071
First version: November 2022
Latest version: January 2024 [LINK]
How do banks shape firm turnover and creative destruction? This paper develops a growth model in which creative destruction is driven by the decision of banks to liquidate long-term loans with high default risk. We show analytically and quantitatively that policies aimed at encouraging more loan liquidation (e.g., reformed insolvency laws) do not only accelerate firm turnover and improve aggregate productivity, but also foster firm creation and boost growth. Such improvements at the exit margin complement policies designed to stimulate firm creation (e.g., start-up subsidies). The complementarity between entry and exit emerges because loan liquidation releases funds for new lending and thus relaxes the aggregate funding constraint, leading to a lower interest rate that benefits new firms. Due to this interest rate effect, tighter bank capital regulation may even increase firm creation whenever bank funding is inelastic.
Firm dynamics and growth with soft budget constraints (with P. Aghion, A. Bergeaud and M. Dewatripont)
CEPR Discussion Paper No.19996
First version: February 2025
Latest version: March 2025 [LINK]
We introduce a model of endogenous growth and firm dynamics with soft budget constraints. Firms differ in innovation speed and slower firms need additional financing to eventually innovate. As creditors cannot anticipate refinancing needs in advance nor credibly commit to withholding future refinancing, a Soft Budget Constraint Syndrome emerges, causing excessive entry by slow firms and crowding out potentially more efficient innovators. The resulting trade-off between positive effects of budget constraint softening on innovation by incumbents and slow-type entrants versus negative effects on entry by fast innovators generates a hump-shaped relationship between refinancing costs and aggregate growth. Calibrating the model to French firm-level data, we assess the aggregate growth impact of budget constraint softening triggered by the post–financial crisis decline in observed interest payments. Our model can generate about three-fifths of the observed drop in aggregate growth rates, of which 64\% is driven by a direct effect through incumbent innovation and enhanced firm entry, and the remaining 36\% arises from shifts in the firm size distribution induced by budget constraint softening.
Institutional investors and the macroeconomy (JMP)
Latest version: June 2025 [Draft on request]
How does pension fund ownership of non-financial firms affect economic growth? Using archival data and confidential public records, I reconstruct detailed asset allocations for defined-benefit pension schemes in the United Kingdom. I then exploit a regulatory reform that tightened pension fund risk requirements to identify the causal impact of pension fund ownership on firm performance. I find that reductions in pension fund ownership lead firms to cut capital investment and R\&D spending and shift toward shorter-term projects. Specifically, a one percentage point decrease in pension fund ownership results in a 0.8 percent decline in firms’ investment over five years. To explain these findings, I embed an equilibrium asset pricing model with heterogeneous investors into a Schumpeterian growth framework. Pension funds balance benchmarking objectives with constraints on risk-bearing. I characterise how ownership composition influences firms’ investment decisions. I show that pension fund ownership enables firms to undertake larger, riskier investments when their stock returns positively correlate with pension funds’ benchmarks. A calibrated version of the model suggests that a one percent reduction in pension fund ownership is associated with a 0.1 percent drop in annual growth.
The secular decline in real interest rates and the opportunity cost of capital
Latest version: March 2025 [Draft on request]
What is the interaction between real interest rates and economic growth? This paper introduces a model in which real interest rates affect the direction of creative destruction through changes in financial intermediaries' portfolio allocation. Faced with regulatory or financial constraints that limit the size of their balance sheets, intermediaries evaluate new investment opportunities against the going-concern value of their legacy investments. Low real rates decrease the opportunity cost of continuing low-return projects and slow down the reallocation of capital towards high-productivity investments. A long-run decline in real rates has a hump-shaped effect on growth: When real rates are initially high, there is too much reallocation. Falling rates are expansionary. When real rates are already low, there is not enough reallocation and a further decrease depresses growth. Sustained downward pressure on real rates gives rise to a boom-bust cycle. Policies that encourage reallocation, such as tax deductions on unrealised losses, foster growth.
Pension fund activity in private markets: 30 years of evidence from the UK
This paper analyses the investment activity and performance of pension schemes in private equity markets. Using a new data set on the historical asset allocation and returns of British Local Government Pension Schemes (LGPS), I document three trends: (i) there has been a steady increase in private market exposure since the pension reforms of 2004; (ii) pension schemes with historically low portfolio returns have shifted a larger fraction of their capital towards private markets; and (iii) these schemes subsequently did not outperform common public equity benchmarks.
Intangible capital, leverage dynamics, and economic growth (with S. Hobler)
For the last twenty years, corporate bankruptcy rates as a share of firm exit have been declining. We argue that this trend is precipitated by a rise in the importance of intangible knowledge capital and a decline in the importance of physical assets. Because the current bankruptcy code has been designed to facilitate the reallocation of physical capital between firms, it is no longer fit for purpose. This paper builds a model of creative destruction in which firms endogenously choose investment, capital structure, and bankruptcy. A rise in the importance of knowledge capital leads to an initial boom in investment and corporate bankruptcies, and to a subsequent steady decline in corporate restructuring, firm turnover, and investment. The economy's inability to restructure insolvent knowledge-intensive firms encourages the emergence of zombie firms, and culminates in a protracted growth slow-down.